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ABSTRACT
The observed reluctance of most individuals in the United States
to buy individual life annuities, and the Concomitant approximately flat
average age—wealth profile, stand in sharp contradiction to the standard
life cyclemodelof consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this
paperlends support to anexplanation for this phenomenon based on the
interactionof an intentional bequest motive andannuityprices that are
not actuariallyfair.
Premiums charged for individuallifeannuities in the United States
include a load factor of 32-48 perdollar,or l8—33 per dollar after
allowing for adverse selection, in comparison to actuarially fair annuity
values.Load factors of thissizearenotout of line with those on other
familiar (and almostuniversallypurchased) insurance products. Simulations
of an extended model of life cycle saving andportfoliobehavior, allowing
explicitlyfor uncertain lifetimes and Social Security, show that the load
factorcharged would have to be far larger than this to account for the
observedbehavior in theabsenceofa bequest motive. By contrast, the
combinationof a load factor in this range and a positive bequest motive can
doso for some plausible values of the assumed underlying parameters. Moreover,
if this combination of factors is leading elderly individuals to avoid
purchasing life annuities, it implies a typical bequest that is fairly large
in comparison to their consumption.
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ANNUIPRICESAND SAVING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES
Benjamin M. Friedman and Mark Warshawsky*
One of the most puzzling contrasts between observed behavior and
the implications of standard economic theory is the fact that, at least in
the United States, few elderly individuals purchase life annuities. The
conventional life—cycle model, based on the appealing concept that people
save so as to smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, suggests that
elderly retired individuals would seek to dissave out of their available
resources as their remaining life expectancy shortens. Instead, observed
age-wealth profiles among the elderly are more nearly flat.1 Given the
uncertainty associated with any individual's life expectancy, this
reluctance to dissave would be a natural consequence of risk aversion if
individuals could not avoid that risk by buying annuities. Since a
well-developed individual life annuity market does exist in the United
States, however, the challenge is to explain why so few people actually
avail themselves of it.2
In an earlier paper, the authors offered an explanation for this
phenomenon based on a combination of the cost of annuities and a bequest
motive.3 Annuities are costly, in the first instance, because the insurer
must price them to defray ordinary costs of doing business and then earn a
competitive profit. In addition, the typical individual in the population
finds annuities even more costly because of adverse selection —inother
words, the tendency of longer—lived people to buy more annuities than
people facing shorter life expectancies. Both kinds of costs understandably
discourage the purchase of individual life annuities, within the context—2—
of the familiar life—cycle model. By contrast, if individuals choose not
to buy annuities because they have accumulated wealth to leave to their
heirs, rather than to finance their own consumption after retirement, then
the life-cycle model —andwith it, a variety of well known implications
for economic behavior and economic policy —failsto withstand scrutiny.
The principal finding of the authors' earlier research was that during
the early years of retirement the observed cost of annuities can
independently account for the absence of purchases of individual life
annuities, while at older ages the combination of the observed costs of
annuities and a bequest motive of plausible magnitude candoso.
Theobject of this paper is to experiment with an alternative form
ofthe authors' earlieranalysis by representing the cost of annuities as
the(positive) differential between the premiumonan annuity and its
implicit expected value, rather than as the (negative) differential between
the implicit expected yield on an annnity and the available yield on
alternative forms of wealth holding. Given the inverse relationship between
price and yield for any fixed-income invesnent vehicle, in principle
thesetwo forms of analysis are simply the duals of one another. The difference
here stems from the needto compromise with reality in order to investigate
the implications of life annuities within the context of a readily
tractable model of the consumption—saving and portfolio—allocation decisions.
In effect, the analysis both here and in the authors' earlier paper
represents these annuities as if they were one—year contracts. Here,
however, the analysis represents the cost of annuities as a one—time
proportional charge to enter a market in which actuarially fair annuities are
available, while in the earlier paper this cost consists of a continual
unfairness in the pricing of the (one—year) annuity contracts. One—3—
advantage of the approach taken here is that, because large short—sales of
annuities are no longer optimal, the nonnegativity constraint that
was necessary in the earlier paper is no longer required. Because these
formulations of the problem imply alternative opportunity sets, the
results given by the twoapproachesdiffer.
Section I presents raw data on the prices of individual life annuities
sold in the United States during 1968-83, together with transformations
of these data that correspond to familiar concepts in economic discussions
of consumption-saving behavior. Section II reviews the model ofconsumption—
savingand portfolio—allocationbehavior, for an individual with uncertain
lifetimes,developed in the authors' earlier paper. Section III uses
simulations ofthismodel, based on the observed pricing ofannuities to
drawinferences about the respective roles ofannuity costs and a bequest
motive in accounting for the typical elderly retiredindividual 's preference
for maintaining a flat age-wealth profile insteadof buying annuities. Section
IV briefly summarizes the paper's principalfindings, and re—emphasizes some
limitations that apply to the analysis hereaswell as to the authors earlier
work.—4—
I. Prices of Individual Life annuities
Table 1presentsdata for 1968—83, coni1ed from successive annual
issues of the A.M. Best Flitcraft Coutpend, on the per—dollar prices of
guaranteed single-premium immediate annuities offered in the United
States for 65—year—old males. In each case the value shown is the price
(premium) charged to purchase a stream of payments equalling $1 per nDnth,
to begin in the nth iediately following the purchase and continue for the
life of the annuitant.
The first column of Table 1 indicates the nan premium charged on
this basic annuity contract by the ten largest insurance coanies in the
United States. These data are probably the mrst relevant for analyzing
economy-wide individual behavior. The largest insurers usually do business
in all regions of the country, so that the typical 65 -year-old U.S. male
has access to annuities at this mean price with little or no search costs.
is would be expected, the average annuity premium has fallen over tim,
as the effect of rising interest rates has predeminated over the effect of
increasing life expectancy.
The remaining columns of Table 1 indicate the potential returns to
market search by showing the dispersion of premiums charged for this same
basic contract by different insurers .Thesecond and third columns show
data for the highest and lowest premiums charged for this contract by any
of the tenlargest insurers. Presumably most 65—year—old males have access
tothe 1est premium in this groi at only ndest search cost. The final
column of the table shows the lowest premium charged for this contract by any
of the fifty—odd insurers in BestLs saxL1e. Because the smaller couanies
in the sanle do not necessarily maintain sales forces in all parts of the
country, however, there is no presuntion that the typical 65—year-old maleTABLE 1
PREMIUMS FOR IMMEDIATE $1 MONTHLY LIFE ANNUITIES
Ten Largest Insurers Cosplete
Sample
Mean High Low Low
1968 $132.10 $136.20 $128.60 $127.20
1969 129.90 134.30 125.20 123.90
1970 127.40 133.70 119.30 116.70
1971 124.60 133.70 115.80 115.80
1972 124.70 133.70 117.70 117.70
1973 123.20 131.00 117.70 117.70
1974 121.70 127.60 115.80 115.50
1975 118.70 123.80 113.30 113.30
1976 116.60 123.30 111.40 107.90
1977 116.60 122.10 113.30 109.10
1978 116.60 122.10 1133O 109.10
1979 117.20 122.40 113.30 105.90
1980 113.40 119.90 105.70 101.80
1981 109.00 116.60 103.20 92.30
1982 104.90 116.60 87.60 75.30
1983 103.70 116.60 90.80 81.80
Note:Quotations are for 65-year-old males.—5—
has ready access to this complete—saile lowest premium.
Table 2 presents calculations of the present expected value of an
immediate $1 monthly annuity for the life of a 65-year-old male. The two
key ingredients in such calculations, of course, are the assumed interest
rate and the assumed structure of mortality probabilities.5 The table
reports annual calculations of present expected value based on two different
interest rates, the 20—year U.S. Government bond yield and the average
yield on corporate debt directly placed with major life insurance conanies.
In the calculations underlying the first two columns of the table, the
assumed mortality probabilities are the general population mortality
probabilities for 65-year-old males reported in the 1970 and 1980 U.S.
Life Tables, adjusted by a factor of •985to reflect the 1.5% annual
irovement in U.S.malemortality probabilities that has occurred over
the last two decades, and by a further factor of .9925 to reflect the
asstion of a future 0.75% annual irovement in male mortality probabilities
6
forall ages.
Which of the two interest rates used in Table 2 is most relevant
depends on the perspective taken in the analysis. From the standpoint of
the actuarial "fair" value to an insurer who has access to (and
typically owns), direct placement securities, the associated hier yield is
the correct one to choose. Alternatively, from the standpoint of an
individual's opportunity cost of funds, the lower yield on U.S. Government
bondsis relevant ifthe individual has no better investment vehicle.
Becausedirect placements bear higher yields than do Government bonds, the
presentexpected values calculated using this yield are smaller than the
corresponding values calculated using the Government bond yield. Nevertheless,
the present expected values calculated on either basis, including theTABLE 2
PRESENT EXPECTED VALUES OF $1 MONTHLY LIFE ANNUITIES
MDrtality Probabilities: —GeneralPopulation Annuity Purchasers
Government Direct Government Direct
Interest Rate: Bonds Placements Bonds Placements
1968 $104.80 $92.19 $120.81 $104.80
1969 99.49 87.64 113.81 98.92
1970 96.67 80.14 110.04 89.50
1971 101.41 85.84 116.59 96.86
1972 102.74 88.48 118.06 100.00
1973 96.16 88.25 109.46 99.53
1974 91.23 82.23 103.07 91.91
1975 90.93 79.49 102.52 88.41
1976 93.23 83.67 105.20 93.37
1977 94.83 87.88 107.01 98.39
1978 90.66 85.04 101.65 94.75
1979 86.64 80.67 96.56 89.29
1980 77.43 70.21 85.61 76.92
1981 69.31 63.24 75.75 68.57
1982 72.25 65.57 79.15 71.23
1983 78.69 74.38 86.77 81.58
Note: Calculations are for 65-ye-ar-old males.—6—
Government bond yield, are always smaller than even the lowest preiniuni
charged in the same year by any insurer in Best"s sample.
If all individuals had identical mortality probabilities, a
comparison between the calculated present expected values showninthe
first two columns of Table 2 and the actual premiums shown in Table 1
would indicate the "load factor" by which the pricing of these annuities
differs from their fair actuarial value. In fact, many individuals have
information that leads them to expect either a shorter or a longer life
than the population-wide average. Insurers, however, typically charge a
uniform premium to all individuals of the same age and sex, presumably
becauseinformation about individualmortality probabilitiesiseither
impossibleor toocostlytoobtainanduse. Individuals expectinglonger
(shorter) thanaverage lifespanswillthereforeperceive lifeannuities
as more (less) attractively priced, andhence willbe more (less)likely to
buy them.7This adverseselection —adversefromthe viewpoint of the
insurer, that is —willleadto underwriting losses if the insurer continues
tocharge a premium thatis actuariaflyfair to the populationas a whole.
Thefinal twocolumns of Table 2 therefore present theresults of
further annual calculationofthe present expected value of the same basic
annuity contract for a 65—year-old male, based on the sametwointerest rates
asbefore, but now based on alternative mortality probabilities compiled from
the actual company experience on individual life annuity contracts issued
inthe United States during 1971-75, again adjusted as indicated aboveto
reflect the improvement in mortality probabilities.8 Figure 1 indicates
the extent to which the sub—population who choose to buy annuities in fact
have a greater survival probability than the general population. Because
of this greater life expectancy, the present expected values shown in theFIGURE 1
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lasttwo columnsaregreater than the corresponding values shown in the
table's first and second columns, respectively, based on the same two
interestrates but on general population mortality probabilities. Even
the greater values resulting from the actual company experience mortality
probabilities, however, are still uniformly smaller than even the lowest
correspondingpremiums shown in Table 1. Even within the sub—population who
voluntarily buy annuities, therefore, the price is not actuarially fair.
Table 3 summarizes the differences between the actual premiums
charged on this basic annuity contract and the corresponding actuarially
fair values by showing the 1968-8 3 average of the ratio of premium charged
to present expected value, for each of the four premiums reported in Table 1
and each of the four present expected value calculations reported in Table 2.
The resulting average load factors range from a low of 1.06 for the smallest
premium charged by any cottany in Best' s sa1e, compared to the present
expected value based on Government bond yields and actual coIany experience
mortality probabilities, to a high of 1.55 for the largest premiumcharged
by any of the ten largest insurers, compared to the present expected value
based on direct placement yields and general population mortality tables.
The comparisons in Table 3 that are probably most relevant for studying
economy—wide individual behavior are those shown in the first row for the mean
premium charged by the ten largest insurers versus the present expected value
based on either Government bond yields or direct placement yields, and on
either general population or company experience mortality probabilities.
The load factor of 1.32 for the first case considered means that a 65—year—old
U.S. male, randomly selected from that population, and for whom the Government
bond yield represents the opportunity cost of capital, typically pays
$1.32 for each $1.00 of expected present value when he purchases a life annuity.TABLE 3










¶Ln—LargestI.an 1.32 1.48 1.18 1.33
Tn—LargestHigh 1.39 1.55 1.24 1.40
¶Ln—LargestLc 1.24 1.39 1.11 1.25
Co1ete—Sa1eI 1.20 1.34 1.06 1.20
!te: Calculations are for 65—year-old males.—8—
2½xnongthe (on average longer-lived) sub-population of 65-year-old U.S.
males who actually choose to buy life annuities, the load factor based on
the sameopportunity cost is only 1.18.In other words, of the32cper
dollarload factor to the general population, 14 represents the effect
of adverse selection and the remaining l8 the combination of transactions
costs, taxes and profit to the insurer. If the annuity purchaser's
opportunitycost ofcapital is instead the direct placement yield —for
example, because of ability to buy shares in packages of intermediated
private securities —thenthe load faôtor per dollar of expected present
value is 48, of which 15' represents the effect of adverse selection
and the remaining 33 the insurer' s co st.s, taxes and profit .Asthe
Appendix Table shows, these results for 65 year-old males are similar to
those for females, or for males of different ages.
The question for cons tion—saving behavior, then, is whether an
average load factor of 1.18 (or even 1.48) is sufficient to account for
the smell participation in the individual life annuity market in the
United States. In short, do most elderly retiredpeople choose not to
consumeout of their wealth, arid therefore leave unintentional bequests,
merely because they are reluctant to pay $1.18 (or $1.48) for every $1.O.O.
of present expected value of annuities?
It is difficult to answer this question on the basis of casual evidence
only. At first thought, a load factor of this magnitude seems a large price
to pay for pooling risk. Nevertheless,, it is not out of line with
loads charged elsewhere in the insurance business, in product lines that
alxst everyone buys. For exa1e, data from Best's Key Rating Guide:
Property—Casualty indicate that the recent average load factor in premiums
charged for property and casualty insurance written by large coiranies has
been 1.37 —essentially the same as that on individual life annuities.—9—
Moreover, despite the apparently large load factor, individual
life annuities are not a "dominated asset" in the sense that the cost
per unit of pay-off, unadjusted for mortality probabilities, is
greater than the analogous cost of alternative investment vehicles.
Table 4 shows the present value of a 35-year certain $1 monthly annuity,
calculated using the two interest rates used in Tables 1 and 2, respectively,
for each year during l968_83.10 As comparison to the first column of Table
1 shows, the value of the certain annuity based on the government bond
yield exceeded the mean premium on the life annuity charged by the ten
largest insurers in all years of the sample except 1980-82, while the value
basedon the direct placement yield exceeded the mean premium in all years
until 1979.
Hence some more formal approach to this issue is necessary. Section
IIdevelopsa framework for such an analysis, and Section IIIappliesthat
frameworkin the context of the premium and load factor data reported here.TABLE 4
PRESENTVALUE OF A 35-YEARCERTAIN $1 MONTHLYANNUITY

















II. A Model of Saving and Annuity Demand11
The model used in Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) to analyze
the demand for individual life annuities in the context of life-cycle
saving and a bequest motive is an annuity analog of Fischer's (1973)
model of the demand for life insurance, generalized to incorporate fixed
mandatory holdings of socially provided annuities.'2 The individual's
decision problem in this expanded life—cycle context is to maximize
expectedlifetime utility
w-x-1
E(U) [PtUt(ct) + (1)
wherew is theassumed maximum length of life, x is the individual's age
asof timet=0Pt iStheprobability thatanindividual of age x at t=0
will be alive at anytime t>O, is the (conditional) probability that
such an individual who wasalive attimetwill die at time t+l.13
Ut(c) is utility received from consumption C at time t, and vt÷i(G+,)
is utility received from (anticipation of) a bequest G at time t+l.
Following Fischer, it is convenient to specify the two utility functions
inthe iso—elastic form
cl_s
U(Ct) = a (2)
V(Gt) = bt
whereis the Pratt—Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion, a is the
time preference parameter, and b (in comparison to at) indicates the
relative utility attached to bequests left in period t.
The usual life—cycle specification of behavior with no bequest motive
is therefore justthespeical case of this model with bt=0 for all t>O.i. i—
In general, however, people mayvaluebequests, and they may value them
differently at different times. The application of the model in Section III
below follows Yaari's suggestion that bt follows a hump-shaped pattern
with higher values during the years when family dependency is important,
so that bt is decliningduring retirement years when children have
typicallybecome independent.
The individual's problem is to maximize (1) subject to a given
initial wealth position and to a nonnegativity constraint on wealth in
each subsequent time period, given the menu of available investment
opportunities (including any mandatory holding of socially provided
annuities)andtheir respectiveyields 14 Ineach period the individual
mustdecidenot only how much of current wealth to consume but also how
to allocate the remainder among the available investment vehicles. The
specific asset menu considered here includes a riskless one—period bond
bearing gross rate of return Rt a one—period social annuity bearing gross
rate of return to survivors, and aone—period market annuity bearing
grossrate of return Qtosurvivors.15 Both annuities are actuarially




With little relevant loss of generality, it is convenientto set Rt constant
at R for all t>O.
The dynamic programming solutionto this problem proceeds from the
finalperiod t=w-x-l, in which the certainty of death atthe end of the
period =1)simplifies the problem of an individual who hassurvived to
that date to merely choosing C1 to maximize the sum ofutility from
current consumption Ui(C_1) and utility from bequests V(G)
subject to then-remaining wealth W1 and theconstraint—12—
G =R(W -c w-x w-x—l w-x-1 (5)
Given the iso-elastic utilities assumed in (2) and (3), the solution is
just
C =k •W (6) w—x—l w—x—l w—x—1
where
R(Pb )l/
k = w-x (7) w-x-1l+R(Rb
and the correspondingindirect utility function
J[W I =max{tJ (C) +V (G)} (8)










The consumption decision (5)represents the entire solution for t=w—x—l,
since in that period the availability of annuities is irrelevant to the
analysis.
The dynamic programming solution next proceeds to the individual's
optimal consumption and portfolio decisions for the immediately prior period,
given wealth remaining at that time. An individual alive at t=w-x-2 will
die at the end of that period with probability q1. Hence the relevant
maximand governing the decisions to be taken as of t=w-x-2 is U (C w—x—2w—x—2
plus thebequest motive V (G )withprobability q andthe
w—x-1w-x-l w-x-l
indirect utility function in (9)with probability (l—q1) .Theindirect—13—
utility function for t=w-x-2 is therefore
C1 (W -c)1
w—x—2 w—x--2 w—x—2
j{W I= max { + (l-q )a
2w—x--2 l— w—x—l w—x—l l— C2
•[R(l-A -s )+QA A +QS Il_
w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2
(w -C
+q b • w—x—2 w—x—2 •[R(l—A — (11)
w—x—l w—x—l 1— w—x—2 w—x—2
whereAand S are the proportions of saving (W—C) invested in market
annuities and (mandatorily) insocialannuities, respectively. The
usuallife—cyclemodel with no market for annuities is therefore just the
special case represented by At=O for all t>O (and, if there are no social
annuities either, SO for all t>O also)
The first-order conditions for (11) then give the optimal values
of consumption and purchases of market annuities at t=w=x—2 as





and the corresponding value of the indirect utility function as
(14)




w—x—2 l+k I (1D)
Lw-x--2j
and
k =[cx6 (R(l-A-s ) +QA A + s w—x—2 w—x—1 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2 w—x—2
+b q (R(1-A -S ))1]_1/ (16) w—x--1 w—x—1 w—x—2 w—x—2
The remainder of the dynamic programming solution proceeds backward
to the initial period t=O in an analogous way. The expressions for each
period's optimal consumption andpurchasesof market annuities, and for
eachperiod's value of the indirect utility function, are of the same
form(but with subscripts adjusted accordingly) as (12),(13) and (14),
respectively.—15—
III.SimulationResults
The model developed in Section II generates lifetime streams of
consuntionand annuity purchase values that are optimal for given values of
parameters describing preferences (,ci.and b), the market environment
A S
(R, QandQ), andmortalityprobabilities (p andq). The principal
focus of interest in this paper is on one aspect of preferences and one
aspect of the market environment —thebequest tive and the availability
of market annuities, respectively.
The strategy adopted here for representing the bequest tive
(confronting a 65-year-old male) follows Fischer (1973) by assuming that
bt in (3) varies according to
bt =(1.04
—.Olt)'0, t=0,...,35 (17)
where 0 is a non-age—specific parameter indicating the individual's life-
long preference for bequests relative to current consumption, given the
other parameters of the model, including in particular the interest rate
(R), the curvature of the utility function (s),and—because0 implicitly
givesthe relative weight of a stock(thebequest) versus a flow
(consumption)—theassumedtimeunit of analysis. For any given value
of0,however,bdeclineslinearly with t.17 Given 0and the bequest
amount is larger as P is higher, and smaller asis higher. For example,
from (5)—(7)and(17), 0takes thevalue (Gwx/Cw_i) (.69)/P, where
(G/C )is just the ratio of the final-period bequest to the prior-
w—Xw—x—1
periodconsumption. The normally limiting case for altruistic bequests,
in which an individual provides for his heirs' consumption at the same
level as his own, indicates (l/R-1) 1.69)/Pasthe logical upper bound on
l8In thesimulations reported below, the strength of the bequest—16-
motive is indicated initially by 0, and subsequently by the corresponding
bequest/saving ratio (G/Ci) given the other assumed parameters.
The strategy used here to represent the market for private annuities
follows Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) by assuming that private annuities are
either available at the actuarially fair price =R/(l—q),or, alternatively,
not available at all(A=O).The object of the analysis, therefore, is
to determinewhat loadfactor an individual would be willing to pay in order
to haveaccessto marketannuities under theassunEdvalues ofall of
themodel'sother paranters. By coraring this critical load factor
withthe typicalloadfactors summarized in Table3, inlight of the
observation that in fact only few individuals actually purchase life
annuities, it is then possible to assess the reasonableness of the assumed
values of the model's other parameters —including,in particular, the
strength of the bequest motive.
This treatment of the cost of annuities captures the chief implications
of the fact that, although the model in principle refers to one—period
annuities, in fact the annuities available for purchase are life annuities.
Even when an individual makes monthly annuity purchases over time,
as in many defined contribution retirement plans, what he is buying each
month is an additional life annuity. It is therefore plausible totreat
theload factors or annuity premiums shown in Table 3 in a lump-sum
fashion, not as a load to be repeated in every period.
The simplest place to begin is the special case of the model
developed in Section II corresponding to the standard life cycle model
with neither bequest motive nor Social Security (which is equivalent to the
model inKotlikoff and Spivak).Table 5sunixnarizesthe results of two
simulations of the model, lxth based on the assumptionsthatbt=O and


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































preference parameter is c=.99,andthe assumed market interest rate is
constant at R=l.01. The assumedcoefficientof relative risk aversion is
=4l9 Theassumed mortalityprobabilities arethosefor a 65-year--old male
reported in the 1980 U.S. LifeTables,adjusted as described in Section I.
Fbreachsimulation, Table 5showsthe relevant solution values for the initial
year(age 65) and every fifth year thereafteruntilthe assumed maximum
life span (age 110).
The first simulation considered within this traditional life cycle
context represents the case in which market annuities (like social annuities
here) are unavailable. The individual' s only choice is therefore how much
to cons in each period, since the unconsumed portion of initial wealth
is autotically invested in one-year bonds. The first column of Table S
shows the optiir1 age—consution profile,while the second column shows
thecorresponding i1ied profile of remaining wealth (consisting entirely
of bonds), with both sets of values stated as percentages of initial
wealth. Thesesimulatedvalues ilNnediately indicate the important
contrast between reality and themodel's assumptions, in that they show the
optility of a declining age—consuixtion profile and a sharply declining
age—wealth profile —phenomenanot observed in available dáta.
The second simulation within this traditional life cycle context,
sinnmrized in the remaining columns of Table 5, shows that simply relaxing
the assumption that market annuities are unavailable avoids this strikingly
counterfactual result only at the expense of leading to another. This
simulation differs from the first one in assuming that individual life
annuities are available in the private market at an actuarially fair price
(QA=p/(1_q)) and the table reports values for optimal consumption as well
as optimal wealth holdings in bonds and annuities,respectively.2° In this
case, the individual's optimal course of action is to hold no bonds at all—18—
butto stabilize the age-consumption profile almost completely by investing
all wealth in annuities. The implied flat age—consumption profile is
roughly consistent with the available evidence, but the implied large demand
formarket annuities is sharply counterfactual.
Following Kotlikoff and Spivak, it is possible to infer the lunp—sum
value to the individual, underthe conditions assumed inthe simulations
reportedin Table 5,ofhaving access to a market for actuarially fair
life annuities. From (14), the initial value of the indirect utility
function in each simulation is
Wi - j [W]= (18) w—x0 0 l—
forgiven initial wealth W0. Theproportional increment inthe individual' s
initial wealth required to render the individual as wefl off, in the sense
of an equal initial value of the indirect utility function, in the absence
of an annuity market as with such a market is therefore just
1 r AQR/(l-q) 0 -l (19)
L0IA=0
where0QA=(_q)is the valueofin (18) in the simulation with a
market for fair annuities and 601A=0 is the analogous value in the simulation
with no annuity market.
For the pair of simulations reported in Table 5, the calculation in
(18) yields M=1.13. Under the conditions assumed inthese simulations,
therefore, itwould still be preferableto put all of initial wealth into
annuities than to buy none at all, as long as the load factor did not exceed
L*=2.l3.23 Because L*=2.l3 far exceeds the load factors in actualannuity
prices calculated on any of the bases reported in Table 3,and yetin fact—19—
there is little individual demand for life annuities, some otherassumption
common to the two simulations shown in Table 5 must be importantly counterfactiial.
One possibility,of course, is that =4 overstates the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. Alternative simulations with a smaller risk
aversion parameter show that this is not the source of the problem, however.
Table 6 summarizes a pair of simulations that are identical to those
reported in Table 5exceptfor the new assumption =2.22 Although the
specificage-consumption and age-wealth profiles shown in Table 6 differ
somewhat from those in Table 5, the same counterfactual implications are again
readily apparent. Indeed, because of the lower risk aversion the optimal
age—consumption and age—wealth profiles when annuities are unavailable
decl me even more sharply. When actuarially fair annuities are available,
it is again optimal to invest all of initial wealth inthem. Most
importantly,even with lower risk aversion the proportional increment in
initial wealth required to render the individual as well off in the absence
of an annuity market as with such a market is still M= .88. Even with
lower risk aversion, therefore, it would still be preferable to put all of
initial wealth into annuities than to buy none at all, as long as the
load factor did not exceed L*=l.88—a critical value again well in excess
ofany of the observed load factors reported in Table 3.
A further possible explanation for the counterfactual results in
}xth Tables 5 and 6 is that Social Security not only exists but is a large
part ofwealth for most individuals. Table 7presents a pair of simulations
ofthe more general model developed in Section II —firstwithout, and then
with,a market for actuarially fairannuities —basedon the assumption that
actuariallyfair Social Security constitutes half of total wealth (S=.5) •23


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































simulationsareanalogous to those reported in Table 5.
Theresults shown in Table 7 again exhibit largely the sa
coimterfactual patternsas inTable 5, and therefore suggest that merely
allowing for Social Security cannot account for the observed behavior either.
In the absence of an annuities market, the optial age-consumption and
especially age-wealthprofiles decline fairly sharply, although not so much
so as in Table 5.If actuarially fair annuities areavailable,it is
optimalto invest all of total wealth other thanSocial Security in
purchasingthem. Most importantly, even with a sizeable role for Social
Security the proportional initial wealth increment required to render the
individual as well off without as with a private annuity market is M= .33.
Hence it would still be preferable to put all of total wealth other than
Social Security (that is, one-half of total wealth) into private annuities
rather than buy none at all, as long as the annuity load factor did not
exceed L*=l .66 (=1 +.33/.5) —againfar greater than the load factors
actually observed. n analogous simulation based on the lower risk
aversion value of =2 (not shown in the table) produces alnst identical
results, with M=.3l and a critical load factor L*=l.62.
The potential elanation for the observed behavior that is of
greatest interest in the context of this paper is that, in general, people
may value not just their own consumption but also bequests. Table 8 presents
three further pairs of simulations of the fully general model developed in
SectionII, in each case based on the sameassumptions as in Table 7
(includingthe prominent role for Social Security) and, in addition, a
positive bequest motive. The first of these three pairs of simulations assumes
the bequest motive 0=2, which is quite modest given the stock-flow dimension
of 0, and the model's useofan annual time unit, and =4. The second pair
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The simulation results reported in TabloSshow that even a very
modest bequest motive is sufficient to eliminate one of the importantly
counterfactual aspects of the earlier simulations. In particular, because
ofthe bequest motive it is no longer optimal to invest all of total
wealthother than Social Security in private annuities. Thefraction
ofwealth investedinbonds varies positively with the strength
of the bequest motive, but even 0=2 is sufficient to make optimal bond
holdings neither zero nor trivially small. Ibreover, optimal bond holdings
donot decrease (until the final year they actually increase slightly) with
age. Hence thegeneralmodel,with evena modest positive bequest motive,
is consistent withobservedbehavior in ilyinganapproximately flat
age-wealth profile for thepart ofwealth held in non-annuity form.
Bycontrast, the results forall threepairs ofsimulations shown
in Table 8 continue to be counterfactual in ilying that, when private
annuities are available, it is optimal to use a large fraction of total
wealth other than SocialSecurityto purchase them. Further analysis,
however, indicates that here the load factor in annuity pricing is
potentially very iiortant.
For the weak bequest motive 0=2, the proportional initial wealth
increment required to render the individual as well off without as with a
private annuity marketisM=.22. The critical load factor necessary to
makebuying no annuities at all preferable to investing 41% of initial
wealth in annuities is therefore L*=1.53 (=1 +.22/.41),again above the
observed load factors reported in Table 3 for the mean premiums charged by
the ten largest insurers, regardless of the mortality probabilities and the
interest rate used in the calculations.
For 0=8, the initial wealth increment required to render the individual—22—
as well off without as with a private annuity market is only M=.l8, so
that the critical load factor that would make buying no annuities at all
preferable to investing 38% of initial wealth in annuities is L*=l.47. As
Table 3 shows, this load factor is approximately equal to that charged on
average by the largest ten insurers if the underlying present expected value
calculation relies on general population mortality probabilities and the
interest rate on corporate direct placements. Nevertheless, it still
exceeds the implied load factor confronting an individual who knows that
bismortalityprobabilities are characteristic of other annuity purchasers,
or whose opportunity cost of funds is the government bond yield (or who
searchesfor the lowest available premilmi)
Filially,for 0=24, the initial wealth increint required to render
the individual as well off without as with a private annuity market is M=l .14.
nce the critical load factor that wouldmakebuying no annuities at
allpreferableto investing35%of initial wealth in annuities is L*=l.40,
about in the middlebetweenthe actual load factor based on general
population mortality probabilities and the direct placement yield and the
actual load factor based on alternative assuntions.
Undersonssets of plausible assumptions, therefore, importantly
including a positive bequest motive, the actual load factor included in
the premiums on individual life annuities sold in the United States is
sufficient to make people prefer buying no annuities at all over buying
the amount that would be optimal if annuity prices were actuarially fair.
Although this finding ishardlywithout interest, sinceit indicatesa joint
rolefor the bequest motive and for annuity load factors in explaining the
observed behavior, it still does not fully explain the fact that almost no
one buys any individual life annuities. Nothing forces people to choose—23—
between buying either the amount of annuities that would be optimal at
actuarially fair prices or buying none at all. Hence showing under
what conditions people would prefer no annuities at all to the amount
they would purchase at actuarially fair prices still does not establish
the conditions under which they would not buy some amount that is
significant albeit less than the actuarially fair optimum. For the
assumed values of 0, R,and S underlying the simulations reported in
Table 8, for example, and for an assumed annuity load factor of L=l.40
(thecritical value for 0=24) ,thestrength of the bequest motive required
to make the individual indifferent between purchasing private annuities
equal to 1% of initial wealth (including Social Security) and purchasing
none at all is 0=343 —farabove 0=24, yet still below the logical upper
bound for 0 given the assumed parameter values. Table 9 summarizes the
results of analogous simulations based on various values of 5, R and ,
reportingin each case the value of 0 that renders the individual just
indifferentbetween investing 1% of initial wealth (including Social Security)
inprivate annuities and purchasing none at all when the load factor is
L1.40.24
Both because the quantitative importance of bequests in overall
saving is a question with major implications for both positive and normative
issues,25 and also because there is little other way to evaluate the
plausibilityof values of 0 within the logically admissible range, it is
interesting to see just how large these results suggest that the typical
bequest should be. Table 10 shows, for each of the combinations of
parameter values considered in Table 9, and in each case for the value of the
bequest motive parameter 0 (as shown in Table 9) needed to render the
individual indifferent between investing 1% of initial wealth in privateTABLE 9









=4 419 105 22
Notes: Values shown are for 0, just sufficient to eliminate initialannuity
purchases equal to .01 of initial wealth.
Assumed values (other than S,R andas shown) are a=.99andL=1.40. Calculations are for 65—year--old males.TABLE 10
RATIO OF EXPECTEDBEQUEST TO FINALPERIODCONSUMPTION
S=.4 S=.5 S=.6
R=l .01
=2 3.40 2.40 1.60
=3 4.77 3.34 2.25
5.56 3.85 2.63
R1 .04
=2 2.57 1.82 1.29
=3 3.52 2.51 1.67
4.08 2.89 1.95
Notes:Valuesshownare ratiosof expected bequest to final period
consumption,given 0justlarge enough to eliminate initial
annuity purchases equal to .01 of initial wealth.
Assumed values (other than S, R andas shown are c=..99, L=l.40 and
as shown in Table 9.
Calculations are for 65—year—old males.—24—
annuities and purchasing none at all when the load factor is L=l.40, the
corresponding bequest/consumption ratio (G/C ).Forthe most part w—Xw-x—l
these estimates are closely bunched, despite the wide variation in the
underlying parameter values, typicallyindicating a bequest equal to
two to four times the final year's consumption. Especially for the lower
end of the range, these estimates appear to be empirically plausible.26
Given the respective roles of S, R andin affecting the demand
for annuities in the model developed in Section II, their corresponding
roles here in determining the strength of bequest motive necessary to
eliminate that demand (for a given load factor) is straightforward. The
demandfor individual lifeannuitiesissmaller as Social Security is
moreimportant, smaller as the rate ofreturnishigher, and greater as
peoplearemore risk averse. Hence the bequest motive implied by the
fact that few people buy individual life annuities is weaker as Social
Security is more important, weaker as the rate of return is higher, and
stronger as people are more risk averse.
Insum, the results shown in Tables 9 and 10 indicate that for
plausible sets of assumed parameter values the combination of an annuity load
factor in the observed range (see again Table 3) and an empirically
plausiblepositive bequest motive in the theoretically admissible range for
altruistic bequests is sufficientto explain the absence of purchases of
individuallife annuities. This finding lends strength to the view that
desired bequests are an important element in consumption—saving behavior.
Moreover, when SocialSecurity is less important and people are more
risk averse, the bequest motive assumes an especially large role in
explaining why so few people buy annuities. Under these circumstances the
indicated bequest is at least four times final consumption.—25—
iv. Conclusion and Further Thoughts
Theobserved reluctance of most individuals intheUnited States
to buy individual life annuities, and the concominitant approximately flat
average age—wealth profile, stand in sharp contradiction to thestandard
life cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this
paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenonbased on the
interaction of an intentional bequest motive and annuity prices that are
not actuarially fair.
Premiums charged for individual life annuities in the United States
doinclude a load factor of 32—48 per dollar, or l8—33 per dollar after
allowing for adverse selection, in conarison to actuarially fair annuity
values. Loadfactors of this size arenotout of linewiththose on other
familiar (and almost universally purchased) insuranceproducts.Simulations
ofan extended model of life cycle saving andportfoiobehavior, allowing
explicitlyfor uncertain lifetiits and Social Security, show that the load
factor charged would have to be far larger than this to account for the
observed behavior in the absence of a bequest motive. By contrast, the
combination of a load factor in this range and a positive bequest motive, can
do so for some plausible values of the assumed underlying parameters. Moreover,
if this combination of factors is leading elderly individuals to avoid
purchasing life annuities, it implies a typical bequest that is fairly large.
in comparison to their consumption.
As the authors' earlier work has already emphasized, caution is
appropriatein relying on these conclusions without further research.
Although the model used here does generalize the standard life—cycle model
in several potentially important ways, it still excludes a priori a variety
of further possible explanations for the observedbehavior:27 First, many—26—
people at least say that they choose stable age-wealth profiles, rather
than eitherbuying annuities or simply consuming out of wealth, not because
of mortality considerations but from fear of the consequences of
catastrophic illness. Second, while the analysis here follows the recent
literature by impilcity working in real terms, the individual life
annuities available in U.S. markets quarantee specified nominal payments.
Third, the analysis here does not allow for several more complex kinds
of possible interactions within families, including, for example, either
non-altruistic ("manipulativet') bequests or intra-family risk sharing.28
Finally, in contrast to the reliance here (and in just about all of the
available literature on the subject) on the standard theory of expected
utilitymaximization, there is evidence that, especially when the prospect
of rare events is involved, individuals systematically overweight the
29 probability of rare events.
These further possible explanations for the fact that few people
purchaseindividual life annuitiesremain as objects for future research.APPENDIX TABLE 1
MEAN LOAD FACTOR FOR LIFE ANNUITY PREMIUMS










Premium and Load Factors for 65-Year--Old Females:
Ten—Largest Mean 1.26 1.42 1.18 1.35
Ten—Largest High 1.34 1.52 1.26 1.44
Ten—Largest I.i 1.18 ..1.33 1.11 1.26
Coirlete—Samp1e Low 1.15 1.30 1.08 1.23
Premium aridLoadFactorsfor70-Year-OldMales:
1.30 1.43 1.16 1.29 Ten—Largest Mean
Ten—Largest High 1.37 1.51 1.22 1.36
Ten—Largest Low 1.24 1.36 1.11 1.23
Complete—Sample Low 1.18 1.30 1.06 1.17
Premium andLoadFactorsfor75-Year-OldMales:
1.40 1.15 1.26 Ten—Largest Mean 1.29
Ten—Largest High 1.35 1.47 1.21 1.33
Ten—Largest Low 1.23 1.34 1.10 1.21
Co1e te —Sample Low 1.15 1 .25 1.03 1.13Footnotes
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1. See, for example, Mirer (1979) and Hubbard (1983)
2. The Retirement HistorySurveyindicates that only 2% of the elderly
population ownindividualannuities of any sort; see, for example,
Friedman and Sjogren (1980).
3. SeeFriedmanandWarshawsky(1985).
4. This dispersion probably reflects search costs; see, for example,
Pratt et al. (1979). Alternatively, it could reflect different
marketingchoicesby different insurers.
w-x-l
-t 5. The exact expression used is (1+r) where w is the assumed
t=1 x
TflTfllengthof life (here taken to be 110 years), x is the age at
the date of issue (here 65 years), r is the relevant interest rate, and
p is the probability that an individual of age x at time t=l will
surviveto anyyear t>l. These annualcalculationsarethen converted
to a monthly basis.
6. The calculations rely on the 1970 tables for years 1968—70, on the 1980
tables for years 1980—83, and on both tables (weighted) for years 1971-79.
See Faber (1982) for a complete description of the U.S. Life Tables,
and Wetterstrand (1983) for a discussion of improvements in mortality
probabilities. In the calculations for females suxmnarized in Appendix
Table 1 below, the correspondingadjustsient factors are .98and .99.
7.See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) for an analysis of the principles
underlying this kind of adverse selection.
8. See Society of Actuaries (1983) for the actual company experience tables.
9. This latter comparison is the relevent one from the perspective of the
insurer. Informal discussions with insurers suggested that, of this 33
per dollar, roughly 1l reflected transactions costs (narrowly defined),
8 taxes, and l4 return to capital at risk. This break—down is at best
only suggestive, however.
10. The small probability that a 65-year—old male will survive past age 100
is simply ignored for purposes of this comparison.Ii. This section draws heavily on Friedman and Warshawsky (1985); see
that paper for additional details and references to relevant
literature.
12. In fact, Fischer's model is really an annuity model, despite his
application of it to the demand for life insurance.
13. probabilities Pt and are, of course, conditional on initial
age x. Writing them as p(x) and q(x)1 would be appropriate but
would clutter an already cumbersome notation. Conditionality on
x is to be understood, here and below.
14. In a more general context it would also be necessary to take account
of labor income. The focus of this paper, however, is on the elderly
retired population.
15. As in Fischer (1973), the assumption of one—period annuities makes
theanalysis tractable. The annuities actually available for purchase
in the United States are instead life annuities.
16. The model as written here imposes no nonriegativity constraint on choice
parameterA —thatis, it does not explicitly preclude short salesof
annuities.For most reasonable values of the given parameters, however,
large short sales are not optimal anyway. If they were, imposing a
nonnegativity constraint in solving the model would be straightforward.
17. The time profile in (17) is from Fischer's Appendix Table A2,
extended to age 110. Reasoning analogous to that underlying abel's
(1984) model of life insurance markets suggests that the results could be
very sensitive to whether the value of bequests is rising or falling
with t. In particular, a sufficiently negatively sloped bequest
motive can, under some circumstances, give rise to a negative demand
for annuities. The after—age—65 portion of Fischer's time profile,
usedhere, makes bt decline approximately in step with forc.99as
assumed below.
18. Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) indicate other circumstances under which
0 would not be bounded.
19.Grossman and Shiller (1981) found evidence consistent with a relative
risk aversion coefficient roughly equal to 4. Bodie et al. (1985)
alsoused this value.
20. Wealth held in annuityform is valued at the presented expected value.
21. Inother words, any approximately flat consumption stream exceeding
3.38%of initial wealth each year (7.20% as in the third column of
Table 5, divided by 2.13) would be preferable to the declining
stream shown in the first column.22. Friend and Blume (1975) found evidence indicating a relative risk
aversion coefficient roughly equal to 2.
23. One-half is about the fraction of total wealth constituted by
Social Security and private pensions for the average retired
elderly individual in the United States; see the evidence
provided by Kotlikoff and Smith (1983), Table 3.7.19 (p. 127)..
24. The results shown in Table 9 follow from searching over 0,given
theassumed values of the other parameters. For purposes of
comparisonto the analysis by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the
o values corresponding to =l.25 are (in order, from top to bottom
in the table) 3, 2, 1, 2, 1.5 and 1.
25. See, for example, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981).
26. For males MenchikandDavid (1982 p. 193, Table 1), reported a median
bequest equalto 2.1times annual median labor income (defined as
one—fortieth of average annual labor earnings), and a mean bequest
equal to 4.2 times mean annual labor income.
27. See Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) for a brief discussion of several
of these other possible explanations.
28. See, for example, Berriheimetal. (1984) on non—altruistic bequests
and Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) on intra-fam.ilyrisksharing.
29.See, for example, KahnexnanandTversky (1979)References
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